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I. OVERVIEW
This note discusses one significant change made by a series of new
legislation regarding immigration, namely, the new authority vested in the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to remove undocumented
aliens found in the interior of the country without judicial review. Part II
reviews the current conditions of illegal immigration in the United States.
Part M distinguishes the two categories of undocumented aliens based on the
immigrant's entry status. Part IV examines the new legislation as it applies
to illegal immigrants who seek entry into the United States. Part V discusses
procedural due process concerns raised by the change made by the new law.
Part VI concludes with a summary of the significance of the new law in
addressing the problem of illegal immigration in the United States.
II. INTRODUCTION
Between four and five million illegal aliens currently populate the
United States. Approximately eighty percent of them live in only seven
states: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and
1
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Texas.' An estimated 400,000 additional illegal aliens enter the United
States each year.2 One major area of concern raised by this growing number
of undocumented aliens is employment. 3 Nearly thirty percent of all jobs in
the United States require low-skilled work, which illegal aliens typically
seek.4 Professor Donald Huddle of Rice University claims that for every
twenty undocumented aliens working in this country, thirteen Americans are
out of jobs. 5 The economic cost, according to Huddle, may run as high as
thirty billion dollars a year in unemployment payments, services, and lost
taxes.
6
In the early 1970s, the Federal Government's attention to immigration
heightened. At that time, Haitians began a steady migration to the United
States. By 1981, the number of undocumented Haitians living in the South
Florida area was estimated at thirty-five thousand.7 The number of Haitian
immigrants, however, pale somewhat in the face of the Cuban migration of
1980. The Mariel boatlift or "Freedom Flotilla" brought approximately
125,000 Cubans to the United States within a matter of weeks. 8 Today, the
number of illegal aliens estimated in this country continues to grow. 9
Contributing substantially to the illegal population is the influx of approxi-
mately 250,000 undocumented Mexican aliens that cross the border into
Texas every year.'0 The increasing number of illegal aliens and their
calculated burden imposed on the seven states with heavier concentrations of
illegal aliens have caused some politicians to seek action."
On March 14, 1995, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles appeared before
the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration to request reimbursement for the
1. John Boehner, Immigration in the National Interest Act, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING
HOUSE, Mar. 18, 1996, at 4, available in 1996 WL 8784701.
2. Id. at *5.
3. David Goddy, Illegal Immigrants: What They Cost, What They Contribute, SCHO-
LASTIC UPDATE, Sept. 6, 1985, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1464 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1071
(1984), affd, 472 U.S. 846 (1984).
8. Id at 1464.
9. Dick Kirschten, After The Flood, Boom Times?, 26 THE NAT'L J. 91, Jan. 8, 1994, at
12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
10. Gretchen Parker, Study Cites Inaccuracies in Illegal Immigrant Data, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 5, 1995, at 6.
11. Ellen Debenport, Chiles Now Has Captive Audience on Immigration Series, ST. PETE.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at4B.
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one billion dollars a year the State spends for education, medical care, and a
justice system for illegal immigrants.'2 Requests like these, as well as the
growing concern over terrorism in this country,' 3 prompted Congress to
make changes in the immigration laws.'4 On April 24, 1996, Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA").15 One week later, the Senate voted to amend certain provisions
in the AEDPA including the replacement of expedited procedures for
removing undocumented aliens seeking entry into this country (as well as
illegal aliens found in the interior of the United States) with a less stringent
process. 16 Following months of debate concerning the amendments pro-
posed by the Senate, on the issue of expedited removal procedures, the
legislature struck a compromise which closely resembled the original version
of the AEDPA.17 On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed into law
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
18 With regard to the issue under discussion in this note, the
IRIRA makes only slight conceptual changes to the law under the AEDPA
while leaving its substantive effect intact.
III. BACKGROUND
The legal rights of aliens vary according to their status under the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA").' 9 Two categories of
aliens were developed based on the alien's entry status: deportable aliens
and excludable aliens. 20 If the alien had effected an "entry" into the United
12. Id.
13. Recent acts of terrorism commonly cited in legislative discussion include the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma
City, and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103.
14. Thomas Martin, The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 201,205 (1996).
15. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
16. Senate Votes to Amend Terrorism Bill, Criminal Aliens Feel Impact, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 650 (1996).
17. Clinton Vows Veto of Immigration Bill if Gallegly Amendment is Included, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1111, 1112 (1996).
18. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
19. Jean, 711 F.2d at 1466.
20. Debora A. Gorman, Indefinite Detention: The Supreme Court's Inaction Prolongs the
Wait of Detained Aliens, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 49 (1994).
1997]
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States, whether lawfully or otherwise, and upon the INS' finding of statutory
reasons for the alien's removal from this country, the alien was "deportable"
and required a more extensive procedural course for removal. On the other
hand, aliens who had not yet "entered" this country and met the statutory
requirements for removal22 were "excludable" and were afforded less
procedural due process rights in an adjudication of their claim of entry. 2
The INA defined "entry" as "any coming of an alien into the United
States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether
voluntary or otherwise .. .,,24 An alien who had entered this country and
was subject to deportation was protected by the constitutional right to
procedural due process.2 As part of this procedural due process, the
deportable alien had the right to advance notice of the charges against him.26
The alien was given a hearing before an immigration judge where the burden
of proof was placed on the government. 27 He had the privilege of being
represented by counsel (at no expense to the Government) and was given
reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to present
evidence on his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
Government.2 Final deportation orders entered against an alien were
reviewable directly in federal courts of appeal.29 Other determinations made
in the course of deportation proceedings were also reviewable on appeal, as
well as determinations that were made incident to motions to reopen such
proceedings.30
An alien who was seeking entry into the United States and was subject
to exclusion was limited in procedural rights as compared to an alien subject
to deportation. Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, an alien seeking entry
who was found to be excludable by an immigration officer at the port of
arrival (e.g., the alien was attempting to enter without legal documentation)
would be detained for further inquiry to be made by an immigration judge.3'
In such proceedings before the immigration judge, the excludable alien had
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
23. Jean, 711 F.2d at 1467.
24. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1994).
25. Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953).
26. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1135 (1986).
27. Id. § 1149.
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1994).
29. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1247 (1986).
30. Id.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1994).
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the privilege of being represented by counsel at no expense to the Govern-
ment.32 During an exclusion hearing, a record of the proceedings was kept.33
An alien who was excluded from the United States by a decision from the
immigration judge, while not entitled to judicial review, was entitled to
administrative review.34 Both excludable and deportable aliens had the right
to habeas corpus review with certain individual limitations on the scope of
the review.35
Under this system of illegal alien removal, aliens entering the country
unlawfully were afforded greater constitutional rights in their removal than
aliens who presented themselves to the proper immigration authorities for
entry and had their admission request denied or delayed for something as
minor as improper documentation. Unfortunately, this scheme rewarded
the aliens who surreptitiously gain entry through unlawful means and served
to punish those aliens who sought entry in this country through the proper
channels. 37 With respect to this anomalous dispensation of due process
among deportable and excludable aliens, the AEDPA and the LIIRA make a
significant change.
IV. THE NEW LEGISLATION
The URIRA substantially changes the way excludable aliens may be
removed from this country by amending the INA to read:
(b)(1)(A)(i) In general.-If an immigration officer determines
that an alien... [other than a Cuban] who is arriving in the United
States or is described in clause (iii)38 is inadmissible under section
1182(a)(6)(C)39 or 1182(a)(7),40 the officer shall order the alien
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1994).
34. Id. § 1226(b).
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(d)(1)(A)-(D) (1994). Compare 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(e)(2)(A)-
(C) (West Supp. 1996).
36. Gorman, supra note 20, at 49.
37. Id.
38. Clause (iii) refers to undocumented aliens found in the United States who have not
been physically present in the country continuously for the prior two years. 8 U.S.C.A. §
1225 (West Supp. 1997).
39. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (West Supp. 1997). The text of the statute provides: "Ci)
Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has
sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or entry into the United States
or other benefit provided under this chapter is excludable." Ma
1997]
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removed from the United States without further hearing or review
unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum
under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution.4'
This section of the statute apparently gives the INS the authority to
remove an excludable alien from the country solely upon its own determina-
tion without the necessity of a hearing before an immigration judge. The
IRIRA further expands on this provision of limited judicial review by
providing that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any individual
determination or to entertain any other cause or claim," arising from the
expedited removal process. 42 No court will have jurisdiction to enter
declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief, or to certify a class.43
Judicial review is limited only to habeas corpus proceedings. 44  Even so,
such proceedings are limited to determinations of: 1) whether the petitioner
is an alien; 2) whether the petitioner was ordered removed pursuant to the
summary removal procedures; and 3) whether the petitioner is a lawful
permanent resident, has been admitted as a refugee under section 207 of the
INA, or has been granted asylum under section 208.45 If the court deter-
mines that the alien was not subject to expedited removal, the court may not
grant any relief beyond requiring that the alien be given a hearing.46 Fur-
thermore, in an action against an alien for improper entry or re-entry under
section 275 of the INA (entry at improper place and concealment of facts) or
40. Id. § 182(a)(7)(A)(i). The text of § 1182 provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any immigrant at the
time of application for admission-
(I) who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry
permit, border crossing identification card, or... other valid unexpired passport,
or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality if such
document is required under regulations issued by the Attorney General under
section 1181(a) of this title, or
(II) whose visa has been issued without compliance with the provisions of
section 1153 of this title, is excludable.
Id.
41. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (alteration in original).
42. IaM § 1252(a)(2)(A).
43. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(e)(2).
44. The 1996 Immigration Act: Asylum and Expedited Removal-What the INS Should
Do, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1565, 1572 (1996) [hereinafter Asylum and Expedited
Removal].
45. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Section-by-
Section Summary, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1317, 1337 (1996) [hereinafter Illegal Immigra-
tion].
46. Id.
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section 276 of the INA (reentry of deported aliens), no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear claims collaterally attacking the validity of orders of
exclusion.47 The IIRIRA also precludes administrative review of an exclu-
sion order, except in cases of aliens who claim that they are permanent
residents.48 The Attorney General shall provide a prompt review of a claim
made by an alien who maintains, under oath or under penalty of perjury, that
they have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
49
This new authority to summarily exclude an undocumented alien was
broadened even further by the following provision in the AEDPA found in 8
U.S.C. § 1251:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, an
alien fouid in the United States who has not been admitted to the
United States after inspection in accordance with section 122550 is
deemed for purposes of this chapter to be seeking entry and admis-
sion to the United States and shall be subject to examination and
exclusion by the Attorney General under part IV of this subchap-
ter.51 In the case of such an alien the Attorney General shall pro-
vide by regulation an opportunity for the alien to establish that the
alien was so admitted.52
Prior to the enactment of this law, the rather broad statutory definition
of "entry" was left to the courts to interpret when applying the term to
excludable aliens. In the case of In re Phelisna, 53 a boat carrying approxi-
mately 200 undocumented Haitian immigrants landed on a beach near
Miami. 54 While walking across a nearby causeway, Phelisna was appre-
hended by officials.5 Phelisna claimed that she had made an entry into the
United States and therefore qualified for the more comprehensive deporta-
tion proceeding rather than exclusion proceedings. 56 The court noted that
47. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1997).
48. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(C).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 1225. This section references § 235 of the AEDPA entitled "Inspection by
Immigration Officers."
51. Chapter Four of the AEDPA was entitled: "Terrorist and Criminal Alien Removal
and Exclusion."
52. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West Supp. 1996).
53. 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
54. Id. at 961.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 962.
1997]
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"the statute cannot be read to mean that mere presence in the United States is
enough to show an entry."
57
In the case of In re Pierre, 8 a small boat of Haitian immigrants became
distressed at sea and was towed into West Palm Beach.59 Once in port, the
INS determined that the group did not appear to be entitled to entry and,
under the old statute, their case was referred to an immigration judge.60
While waiting for their case to be heard, the immigrants were paroled from
detention into the custody of a group of ministers. 61 After a claim for
political asylum was denied, the petitioners claimed that their removal
should be heard in deportation proceedings since they had made an entry
into this country. 62 The court in Pierre set out its conclusions of the ele-
ments of entry: "An 'entry' involves (1) a crossing into the territorial limits
of the United States, i.e., physical presence; plus (2) inspection and admis-
sion by an immigration officer; or (3) actual and intentional evasion of
inspection at the nearest inspection point; coupled with (4) freedom from
restraint.
' 63
The AEDPA appeared to clarify the previous statutory ambiguity
concerning entry in section 1251(d) and essentially eliminated the third and
fourth elements of the court's analysis. Undocumented aliens found in the
interior of the country, under the AEDPA, were considered to be seeking
entry and therefore met the requirements for the more expeditious exclusion
proceedings, regardless of their previous ability to elude immigration
officials.
In section 301(a) of the IIRIRA, the new law supersedes the AEDPA by
replacing the definition of "entry" with the concept of "admission." 64 The
terms "admission" and "admitted" now refer to "the lawful entry of the alien
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer."65 In addition, the law replaces the term "excludable" throughout
the INA with the term "inadmissible." 66  The IIRIRA only delineates
57. Id. See also Brancato v. Lehmann, 239 F.2d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 1956).
58. 14 1. & N. Dec. 467 (1973).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 468.
61. Id
62. Id
63. In re Pierre, 14 1. & N. Dec. at 468 (citations omitted).
64. The 1996 Immigration Act: Grounds of Inadmissibility and Deportability and Avail-
able Waivers, 73 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 1641, 1642 (1996).
65. Id (quoting 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (West Supp. 1997) (as amended)).
66. Id. at 1641.
[Vol. 21:915
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between "inadmissible" aliens who are subject to the statutory "screening"
process, which is in essence an expedited removal procedure similar to the
exclusion process of the AEDPA, and aliens who are subject to removal
proceedings, which is similar to the deportation procedure under the
AEDPA. Under the IIRIRA, an alien who is encountered by the INS after
they have entered the United States, and who in removal proceedings cannot
show by clear and convincing evidence that they were lawfully admitted,
will have the burden of showing that they are admissible.67 The change in
terminology made by the IIRIRA may appear to be a matter of semantics, but
this change may have avoided what some might have considered a legal
fiction in the AEDPA with respect to "entering" this country. Nevertheless,
the IRIRA leaves intact the underlying effect of the change in "entry" status
originally made by the AEDPA. The enlarged authority given to the INS to
summarily remove aliens found in the United States who have not been
admitted without judicial review raises concerns for those aliens who are in
this country illegally and are seeking political asylum.
A person may apply for asylum by two methods-affirmatively or
defensively.68 If the person seeks asylum affirmatively, then the person files
67. Id. The text of the IIRIRA concerning "admission" provides:
(13)(A) The terms "admission" and "admitted" mean, with respect to an
alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.
(3) An alien who is paroled under section 1182(d)(5) of this title or permit-
ted to land temporarily as an alien crewman shall not be considered to have been
admitted.
(C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States
shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes
of the immigration laws unless the alien -
(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status,
(ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in ex-
cess of 180 days,
(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States,
(iv) has departed from the United States while under the legal process
seeking removal of the alien from the United States, including removal
proceedings under this chapter and extradition proceedings,
(v) has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
unless since such offense the alien has been granted relief under section
1182(h) or 1229b(a) of this title, or
(vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by
immigration officers or has not been admitted to the United States after in-
spection and authorization by an immigration officer.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13).
68. Maureen 0. Hurley, The Asylum Process: Past, Present, and Future, 26 NEw ENG. L.
Rav. 995, 1013 (1992).
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his or her claim before the government is aware that the applicant is in this
country illegally.69 A defensive claim of asylum is filed as a defense to
deportation or exclusion charges.70 The burden of proof in an asylum case
requires the alien to produce evidence of past persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution. 71 The persecution the asylum seeker suffers from must
be on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group and not merely economic oppression.72 Because
expedited removal places almost complete decision making authority in the
hands of the INS asylum officers, one commentator points out that the
applicant will not have the opportunity to present his or her case de novo in
front of an immigration judge, nor will the applicant have the ability to
appeal an unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.73
In 8 U.S.C. § 1225, the Act addresses how the new provisions of the
IIRIRA approach the issue of asylum seekers in removal proceedings. When
an immigration officer encounters an alien who has not been admitted into
the United States or is suspected of carrying documents that were procured
by fraud, the officer will conduct a pre-screening interview to determine
whether the alien intends to apply for asylum or fears persecution. 74 If the
officer concludes that the alien does not have an intent to apply for asylum
or fear of persecution, the immigration officer can order the alien summarily
removed from the United States. 75 "This officer's removal determination is
not subject to any further administrative review, hearing or judicial over-
sight. '
76
If the immigration officer determines that the alien is inadmissible
(notice that under the AEDPA they would have been termed "excludable")
and the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of
persecution, the officer must refer the alien for an interview by an asylum
69. Id. at 1013.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1016.
72. Id. at 1017.
73. Stacy R. Hart, Don't Call U.S., We'll Call You: A Look at Summary Exclusion as a
Means of Asylum Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1741, 1756 (1994).
74. Asylum and Expedited Removal, supra note 44, at 1571.
75. Id.
76. Id. The pre-screening process does not apply to Cuban immigrants arriving by plane
by operation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225, which states: "[s]ubparagraph (A) shall not apply to an
alien who is a native or citizen of a country in the Western Hemisphere with whose govern-
ment the United States does not have full diplomatic relations and who arrives by aircraft at a
port of entry." Id. § 1225(b)(1)(F).
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officer.77 The asylum officer will determine whether the alien has a
"credible fear" of persecution. 78 A summary of the remaining process in
asylum determinations under the IIRIRA is as follows:
If applicants do not demonstrate "credible fear" they will be re-
moved without further review unless they request review by an
immigration judge (IJ). The IU review must be within seven days
of the asylum officer's decision, during which time the applicant is
to be detained. If credible fear is demonstrated, the applicant will
be detained pending "non-expedited" consideration of the applica-
tion. Aliens may consult with anyone prior to their asylum inter-
view or review, but at no expense to the government. The consul-
tation must not "unreasonably delay the process."79
Note that the review by the immigration judge is limited to inspection of the
immigration officer's determination of "credible fear."80  To assist in
expediting this review within the seven day requirement, immigration judges
may conduct the inspection via a telephonic or video connection rather than
in person.
8 1
V. DuE PROCESS CONCERNS
A. Supreme Court Cases from 1889 to 1902
The underlying issue among all of this legislation is whether the
expedited procedures for removing undocumented aliens without judicial
review infringes on the immigrant's right to procedural due process. Of the
earliest cases concerning the government's authority to exclude aliens is The
Chinese Exclusion Case of 1889.82 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
the power of exclusion of foreigners was an incident of sovereignty
"belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those sover-
77. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
78. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). "Credible fear" of persecution means that there is a signifi-
cant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in
support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien
could establish eligibility for asylum under § 1158 of this title. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
79. Illegal Immigration, supra note 45, at 1335.
80. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
81. Asylum and Expedited Removal, supra note 44, at 1571.
82. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
1997]
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eign powers delegated by the Constitution . .,,83 In 1892, the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to address the due process rights of an excludable
alien in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.
84
In Nishimura Ekiu, a Japanese immigrant was stopped at the port of San
Francisco and was refused entry after inspection by immigration officials.85
The immigrant claimed that her husband was living in the United States but
that she did not know his address. 86 She had twenty-two dollars and told
officials that she was supposed to stop at a hotel and wait for her husband to
call for her.87 The Inspector of Immigration at the port of San Francisco
determined that the immigrant was "without means of support, without
relatives or friends in the United States... and a person unable to care for
herself ... , 88 The inspector concluded that the immigrant was liable to
become a public charge and therefore inhibited her from landing.89 The
circuit court ruled that an immigration law vesting in immigration officials
the exclusive authority to determine a person's right to land did not deprive
that person liberty without due process of law. 90 Considering this case on
appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that the power to exclude or admit
foreigners into the United States was a power "vested in the national
government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of
international relations, in peace as well as in war."9 The Supreme Court
83. Id. at 609; see also Richard F. Hahn, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude
Aliens, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 957 (1982).
84. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
85. Id. at 652.
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id. at 656.
89. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 656.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 659. The Supreme Court elaborated on how the Constitution vests in the na-
tional government the authority to admit or exclude aliens:
It belongs to the political department of the government, and may be exercised
either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes en-
acted by Congress, upon who the Constitution has conferred power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, including the entrance of ships, the importation
of goods and the bringing of persons into the ports of the United States; to estab-
lish a uniform rule of naturalization; to declare war, and to provide and maintain
armies and navies; and to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for
carrying into effect these powers and all other powers vested by the constitution
in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Id. (citing U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604, 609
(1889); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)).
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determined, as to those immigrants seeking entry into the United States, "the
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers
expressly conferred by [C]ongress, are due process of law." 92
Similar conclusions were made by the Supreme Court in Li Sing v.
United States.93 In Li Sing, a Chinese immigrant was denied reentry into this
country based on afederal statute prohibiting the entry or reentry of Chinese
laborers. 94 In order for the immigrant to establish that he was previously a
merchant in the United States, as opposed to a laborer, and therefore quali-
fied for reentry, the statute required the testimony of two credible witnesses
who were not Chinese.95 Li Sihg challenged the statute claiming that it
violated the constitutional guarantees of "equal rights and equal law to all.",96
The Supreme Court answered, this claim by recognizing that deportation is
not equivalent to punishment for a crime.97 The Court reasoned that the
deportation of immigrants is a method of enforcing the return of aliens to
their own country who have not complied with the conditions, upon the
performance of which, the government has determined that the aliens'
continuing residence here shall depend.98 Accordingly, the Court declared
that there was no deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.99
Concluding the early line of Supreme Court cases concerning the due
process rights of excludable aliens was Lee Lung v. Patterson.1' ° In Lee
Lung, a Chinese immigrant who had spent twenty years in Portland, Oregon
as a merchant went back to China and returned to the United States with his
wife and daughter. 10 The collector of customs at Portland agreed to admit
the merchant, but denied entry for his wife and daughter due to a technical
discrepancy in their certificates identifying them and their relation with the
92. Id at 660 (citing Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U.S. 97 (1884)).
93. 180 U.S. 486 (1901).
94. I
95. Id. at492.
96. I1 at 494.
97. Id. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
98. Li Sing, 180 U.S. at 495.
99. Id. The Supreme Court recognized a delineation between forbidding aliens from
entering the country or expelling them from the country and subjecting them to hard labor or
confiscating their property. Id. The Supreme Court noted that if the latter circumstances were
the case, then the aliens would have a right to a judicial trial to establish guilt or innocence.
100. 186 U.S. 168 (1902).
101. Id at 169.
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merchant. 10 2 Upon further inquiry, it was discovered that the wife who
returned to the United States with the merchant was his second wife (in a
polygamous relationship) and the daughter was that of the merchant and his
first wife. 10 3 Based on the evidence, the immigration officials stood on their
denial of entry as to the wife and daughter. 104 The merchant claimed that the
applicable statute made the certificates evidence and the collector exceeded
his jurisdiction by not giving the certificates valid consideration."' The
Court cited Nishimura Ekiu'16 and noted that it was determined in that case
that "Congress might entrust to an executive officer the final determination
of the facts upon which an alien's right to land in the United States was
made to depend .. ,,'07 The Supreme Court held that if Congress did so,
then the executive officer's order was "due process of law, and no other
tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, was at liberty to re-
examine the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its sufficiency.' 0 8
Therefore, the Court reiterated that because jurisdiction is given to the
collector over the right of an alien to land, then jurisdiction is necessarily
given to the collector to pass on the evidence presented to establish that
right.1°9
B. Supreme Court Cases from 1950 to Present
Shortly after World War II and almost fifty years since Lee Lung, the
Supreme Court made the determination that admission into the United States
was a privilege and not a claim of right in Knauff v. Shaughnessy."0 In
Knauff, a United States Army veteran of World War II returned from
Germany in 1948 with a German born wife.' Immigration officials entered
a final order of exclusion against the German woman without a hearing
102. Id.
103. Id. at 173. The Supreme Court pointed out that even though plural marriages may
be recognized in China, the laws of the United States do not consider them valid and therefore
Lee Lung's second wife is not his valid wife under the laws of this country. Id.
104. Lee Lung, 186 U.S. at 173.
105. Id. at 168.
106. 142 U.S. at 651.
107. Lee Lung, 186 U.S. at 175.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 176. See also Lee Gon Young v. United States, 185 U.S. 306 (1902); Fok
Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538 (1895).
110. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
111. Id. at 539.
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based on security reasons.' 12 The Supreme Court began its analysis of this
case by ruling that an alien seeking entry into this country does so under no
claim of right.113 The Court held that "[a]dmission of aliens to the United
States is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Government."
' 1 4
The Court explained that because the exclusion of aliens is a fundamental
act of sovereignty, the right is inherent in the executive power to control the
foreign affairs of the nation and does not stem from legislative power
alone." 5 Therefore, according to the Court, the decision to admit or exclude
an alien is lawfully placed with the President, "who may in turn delegate the
carrying out of this function to a responsible executive officer of the sover-
eign, such as the Attorney General."'" 6 The Court stated that "[t]he action of
the executive officer under such authority is final and conclusive., ' 17 As to
those persons seeking entry into the United States, the Court concluded that
whatever the rule may be concerning the removal of such persons, "it is not
within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to
review the determination of the political branch of the Government to
exclude a given alien."
'118
Further support for the Court's view in Knauff that rules pertaining to
persons seeking entry into this country fall outside the supervision of any
court comes from Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding."9 Kwong Hai Chew was a
Chinese seaman who was admitted to the United States in 1945.120 Thereaf-
ter Chew married a native American and the two bought a home in New
York. 21 Chew was also a World War II veteran having served in the United
States Merchant Marines.'22 After proving his good moral character for the
112. Id. Pursuant to the War Brides Act of June 21, 1941, the President, on November
14, 1941, issued a proclamation which stated that the interest of the United States required the
imposition of additional restrictions upon the entry into and departure of persons from the
United States and he also authorized the promulgation of regulations jointly by the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General. Id. at 540-41.
113. Id. at 542.
114. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
115. Id.; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
116. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543.
117. Id.
118. Id. See also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at
698; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 651. Cf Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
119. 344 U.S. 590 (1952).
120. Id. at 592.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 593.
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preceding five years, in 1949, Chew was admitted to permanent residence in
the United States. 123 With his petition for naturalization pending and after
being screened by the Coast Guard, in 1950, Chew accepted employment as
a seaman on a merchant vessel.' 24 The voyage on the merchant vessel which
Chew had embarked included ports in the Far East. 25 Upon the vessel's
return to port in the United States, Chew was "excluded" by immigration
officials and not permitted to land.126 The Supreme Court declined to follow
Knauff in this case and stated that the decision in Knauff "relates to the rights
of an alien entrant and does not deal with the question of a resident alien's
right to be heard." 127 The Supreme Court in Chew, however, noted that
"[Congress'] authorization of the denial of hearings raises no constitutional
conflict if limited to 'excludable' aliens who are not within the protection of
the Fifth Amendment."' 12
One month after Chew, the Supreme Court heard an unusual story of a
man without a country in the case of Shaugnessy v. United States. 129 Ignatz
Mezei, an immigrant from Hungary, had lived in this country as a resident
alien from 1923 to 1948.130 In 1948, Mezei went to Hungary to visit his
dying mother, was denied entry by the Hungarian government, and detained
for nineteen months due to some difficulty in securing an exit permit.
131
Upon his eventual return to the United States, Mezei's entry was reviewed
by immigration officials and permanent exclusion was ordered without a
hearing based on concerns for national security. 32 Mezei was returned to
countries he had come from on his trip to Europe; however, France and
Great Britain refused to give him permission to land. 133 Also, the State
Department negotiated with Hungary for Mezei's readmission with no
success. 134 Mezei applied for entry to approximately twelve Latin American
123. Id. at 593-94.
124. Chew, 344 U.S. at 593-94.
125. Id. at 594.
126. Id. at 594-95.
127. Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 600.
129. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
130. Id. at 208.
131. Id. Mezei eventually obtained a quota immigration visa issued by the American
Consul in Budapest and proceeded to France where he boarded the lie de France in Le Havre
bound for New York. Id.
132. Id.
133. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209.
134. Id.
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countries, all of which denied his request.135 After twenty-one months of
detention on Ellis Island and a series of habeas corpus proceedings, the
district judge ordered Mezei's conditional parole on bond when the govern-
ment declined to divulge evidence proving Mezei's danger to the public
safety.
136
The Supreme Court observed that Mezei, regardless of his prior
presence in this country, was seeking entry and fell under the existing
immigration laws governing the admissions or exclusions of such aliens.
137
The Court stated that an exclusion proceeding grounded on danger to the
national security, statutorily, does not provide for the detained alien to be
released on bond. 138 Furthermore, the Court noted that the federal statutes
provide that exclusion based on confidential information, the disclosure of
which may be prejudicial to the public interest, may be conducted without a
hearing. 39 The Court reasoned that because the power to exclude aliens
rests with the executive branch to enforce and the legislative branch to enact
laws to regulate such enforcement, largely immune from judicial control,
then the Attorney General cannot be compelled to disclose the evidence
underlying his determinations in an exclusion case and the procedures
elected for carrying out this "fundamental sovereign attribute" is due process
of law. 140 Though this case dealt primarily with the issue of detaining
excluded aliens, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier findings that due
process among aliens who have not been admitted into this country are
limited to the protections afforded by Congress.
The most recent Supreme Court case involving the procedural due
process rights of excludable aliens was the 1985 case of Jean v. Nelson.
141
"For almost thirty years before 1981, the INS had followed a policy of
general parole for undocumented aliens arriving on our shores seeking
135. Id. Mezei then notified the INS that he would exert no further efforts to depart from
the United States. Id.
136. Id. The district judge did not question the validity of the exclusion order but consid-
ered further detention excessive and justifiable only by affirmative proof of Mezei's danger to
the public safety. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209.
137. Id. at 213. See also Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932); Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
138. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216.
139. I. at210-11.
140. Id. at 210 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Knauff, 338 U.S.
at 537; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
141. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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admission to this country."' 42 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the influx of
undocumented aliens arriving in South Florida raised concern regarding the
unusually large number of immigrants and the current system of detention.
43
In response to such concerns, the Attorney General in the first half of 1981
ordered the INS to detain without parole any immigrants who could not
present a prima facia case for admission. 44 The aliens were to remain in
detention pending a decision on their admission or exclusion. 145 This new
policy of detention rather than parole was not based on a new statute or
regulation. 46 A group of Haitian immigrants who were incarcerated and
denied parole under the new policy filed a class action suit seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief. 47 The group alleged that the INS' sudden change
in policy was unlawfully effected by not complying with the notice-and-
comment rule-making procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 148 The group also alleged that the restrictive parole policy, as
executed by INS officers in the field, violated the equal protection guarantee
of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminated against petitioners on the
basis of race and national origin. 49 The district court held that because the
new policy of detention and restrictive parole was not promulgated in
accordance with the APA rule-making procedures, the INS' policy under
which petitioners were incarcerated was "null and void," and the prior policy
142. Id. at 849.
143. Id. Due to the sudden and massive immigration, President Carter appointed a Select
Committee on Immigration to examine the country's immigration problems and that commit-
tee issued a report in February, 1981 finding that an "immigration crisis" existed in the United
States. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1464 (11 th Cir. 1983). The "crisis" passed unresolved
to the new Administration and in March 1981, President Reagan appointed a special task force
to consider solutions. Id. at 1464. The task force included the Secretaries of State, Defense,
Transportation, Labor, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget. Id. One of the solutions recommended by the task force was
detaining aliens without parole pending a determination of their right to enter the United
States. Id.
144. Jean, 472 U.S. at 849.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 851. The district court certified the class as "all Haitian aliens who have ar-
rived in the Southern District of Florida on or after May 20, 1981, who are applying for entry
into the United States and who are presently in detention pending exclusion proceed-
ings ... for whom an order of exclusion has not been entered .... Id. at 849-50 (quoting
Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982)).
148. Jean, 472 U.S. at 849.
149. Id.
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of general parole was restored to "full force and effect."' 0 The district court
also concluded that the "petitioners had failed to prove discrimination on the
basis of race or national origin in the denial of parole."'151 Appeals from both
sides were made, yet in the meantime, pursuant to the district court's
holding, the INS promulgated a new parole policy that was in compliance
with the APA and that required evenhanded treatment and prohibited the
consideration of race and national origin in the parole decision. 5 2 Since the
INS was no longer detaining any class members under the stricken incar-
ceration and parole policy other than those who have violated the terms of
their parole or have arrived subsequent to the district court's judgment, the
court of appeals, sitting en banc, held that the APA claim was moot and
ruled that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the consideration of unad-
mitted aliens for parole.15 3 The court of appeals remanded the case to the
district court for consideration of whether lower-level INS officials have
abused their discretion by discriminating on the basis of national origin with
regard to the remaining Haitian detainees. 54
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals properly remanded
the case to the district court.' With great anticipation that the Supreme
Court would rule on the constitutional issue involving the due process rights
of the excludable aliens, the Court noted that "[i]f there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it
is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such
150. Id. at 850 (citing Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 1006).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 850-51. The Supreme Court noted that this finding was based on the agree-
ment between the petitioners and respondents that the new rule promulgated by the INS was
neutral on its face and required evenhanded treatment of immigrants concerning parole
decisions. Jean, 472 U.S. at 850-51.
153. Id. at 852. The Supreme Court stated:
The question that the district court must therefore consider with regard to the re-
maining Haitian detainees is thus not whether high-level executive branch offi-
cials such as the Attorney General have the discretionary authority under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to discriminate between classes of aliens,
but whether lower-level INS officials have abused their discretion by discrimi-
nating on the basis of national origin in violation of facially neutral instructions
from their superiors.
Id. at 852-53 (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 963 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 469
U.S. 1071 (1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 857.
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adjudication is unavoidable."1 56 The Supreme Court held that because the
new INS policy and statutes provide petitioners with nondiscriminatory
parole consideration, which is all they seek to obtain by virtue of their
constitutional argument, therefore there was no need to address the constitu-
tional issue.157 One commentator criticized the Supreme Court's refusal to
address the constitutional issue by stating, the "Court has failed to vindicate
the due process rights of a group of persons who lack representation in the
political branches of government and who have no other avenue for re-
course." 158 That rejoins the question of whether excludable aliens have due
process rights at all. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a
dissenting opinion in Jean,159 where he defended the position that excludable
aliens are protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Marshall pointed out that the majority's decision rested "entirely
on the premise that the parole regulations promulgated during the course of
this litigation preclude INS officials from considering race and national
origin in making parole decisions."1 60  Justice Marshall argued, however,
that the majority points to no authority other than arguments in the parties'
briefs, which in turn, according to Justice Marshall, cite to nothing of
relevance.' 61 Justice Marshall then examined the applicable regulations,
statutes, and administrative practices governing the parole of unadmitted
aliens and concluded that there were not any nonconstitutional constraints on
the executive's authority to make national-origin distinctions.' 62 After this
examination, Justice Marshall continued that the majority therefore should
have addressed the constitutional issue involved, and proceeded with his
own analysis of the Fifth Amendment as applied to this case.
16 3
156. Jean, 472 U.S. at 854 (quoting Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,
105 (1944)).
157. Id at 854-55.
158. Gorman, supra note 20, at 54.
159. Jean, 472 U.S. at 858 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 859. Justice Marshall claimed that the Solicitor General's representations to
the Supreme Court were not supported by citation to any authoritative statement by the
Attorney General or the INS to the effect that the statute and regulations prohibit distinctions
based on race or national origin. Id. Furthermore, Justice Marshall stated that the Solicitor
General's contention that the statute and regulations do not make such distinctions is merely
an unsupported assertion by counsel apparently coming from the Solicitor General's office, to
which the Supreme Court owes no deference at all. Id. at 865-66.
162. Jean, 472 U.S. at 859.
163. Id. at 868.
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Among the cases cited by the Commissioner of the INS in Jean, in
support of his constitutional claim that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to
excludable aliens, was Knauff v. Shaugnessy, Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
and Shaugnessy v. United States.164 Justice Marshall stated that the narrow
question decided in Knauff and Shaugnessy was that the denial of a hearing
in a case in which the Government raised national security concerns did not
violate due process. 65 Furthermore, Justice Marshall pointed out that the
question decided in Chew was that the resident alien's due process rights
had been violated. 166 Therefore, according to Justice Marshall, the broad
judgment that excludable aliens are not within the protection of the Fifth
Amendment is dicta and deserves no deference at all. 67
Justice Marshall then made his argument, based on logic, for the
application of the Fifth Amendment to excludable aliens. He observed that
when an alien detained at the border is criminally prosecuted in this country,
he must enjoy at trial all of the protections that the Constitution provides to
criminal defendants. 68 Justice Marshall stated, "[s]urely it would defy logic
to say that a precondition for the applicability of the Constitution is an
allegation that an alien committed a crime."'169 Justice Marshall posited that
there is "no basis for conferring constitutional rights only on those unadmit-
ted aliens who violate our society's norms. 170
Justice Marshall noted that the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.'' Justice Marshall stated that the Supreme Court
164. Id. at 868-69.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 872.
167. Jean, 472 U.S. at 872-73.
168. Id. at 873. Justice Marshall quoted Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896), in which the Court stated, in dictum, that "while Congress can 'forbid aliens or classes
of aliens from coming within [our] borders,' it cannot punish such aliens without 'a judicial
trial to establish the guilt of the accused."' Jean, 472 U.S. at 873 (quoting Wong Wing, 163
U.S. at 237). Also, Justice Marshall claimed that the right of an unadmitted alien to Fifth
Amendment due process protections at trial is universally respected by the lower federal
courts and is acknowledged by the government. Id. See also United States v. Henry, 604
F.2d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Casimiro-Benitz, 533 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 926 (1976).
169. Jean, 472 U.S. at 873.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 875.
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employed this standard in the case of Plyler v. Doe.172 In Plyler, a Texas law
allowed the withholding of state funds to school districts for the education of
children not "legally admitted" into the United States and also authorized the
denial of enrollment in public schools to these children. 173 While ruling that
the state's law was unconstitutional, Justice Marshall argued that the
Supreme Court made it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
aliens by quoting the Court in Plyler, which stated, for "[w]hatever his status
under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary
sense of that term."' 174 Justice Marshall contends that this constitutional
recognition and protection of aliens under the Fourteenth Amendment as
applied to the states should also be found under the Fifth Amendment.175
According to Robert D. Ahlgren, writing for the Practicing Law
Institute, courts that have dealt with AEDPA issues have avoided constitu-
tional analysis almost completely. 176 "The court which took up the due
process issue was a panel of the [Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] and cited a
progeny of Knauff-Megei [sic].,' 7 7 The circuit court in Duldulao v. INS17 8
held that section 440(a) of the AEDPA denying judicial review of deporta-
tion orders for aliens convicted of firearm offenses did not offend due
process. 179 In its discussion of the AEDPA, the circuit court stated that
"[f]or reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been
committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.' 180  The
circuit court further explained that "[t]he power to expel aliens, being
essentially a power of the political branches of government, the legislative
and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, with
such opportunity for judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit
to authorize or permit."''8
172. Id. at 875 (referring to Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
173. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 206-07.
174. Jean, 472 U.S. at 875 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210).
175. Id.
176. Robert D. AhIgren, Procedural Due Process in Exclusion/Deportation, in PRAC-
TICING LAW INSTITuTE 1996, at 78 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 71,
1996).
177. Id. (citing Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996) (as amended on Oct. 8,
1996)).
178. 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996). See Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996);
Salazor-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996).
179. Duldulao, 90 F.3d. at 399-400.
180. Id. at 399 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
181. Id. at 400 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1951)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This country was founded by people who were trying to escape tyranny
and longed for a life based on freedom. These people who fought to estab-
lish the United States of America and drafted its Constitution were immi-
grants themselves. Since then, the United States has traditionally been a
place of refuge for those who seek to escape oppression from abroad. As a
result, this country has the most open-door immigration policy in the
world.182 Between 1921 and 1986 approximately 650,000 legal immigrants
were admitted to the United States each year. 183 In 1995, the number of legal
immigrants admitted to this country rose to 800,000.184 As the number of
immigrants in this country, legal and illegal, continue to grow, so too does
the population. As of January 1, 1996, the population in the United States
was 264,290,000 people. 185 America is known as the land of opportunity,
yet for the average worker that opportunity is finite. Currently, the unem-
ployment rate in this country is 5.6%.186 But in 1944, the unemployment rate
was merely 1.2% and in the mid-to-late 1960s it rested in the 3% range.
187
The proliferation of illegal aliens in this country has grown to the point that
it has moved to the forefront in legislative debate. The statistical data and
effect that illegal aliens have on the United States economy requires some-
thing to be done. As a country willing to help immigrants who are op-
pressed, the United States must be watchful for those who seek to take
advantage of our assistance and burden the welfare of United States citizens.
The IRIRA takes bold steps towards addressing the ever growing
problem of undocumented aliens in this country. The additional authority
given to the INS may help make the process of removing illegal aliens more
efficient. In 1995, approximately 80% of the 110,000 cases decided by
immigration judges involved undocumented aliens found in the interior of
182. Senate Approves Omnibus Immigration Bill After Removing Exclusion Provision, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 601, 603 (1996).
183. Susan Crabtree, Immigration Crossroads, INSIGHT, Mar. 25, 1996, at 4, available in
1996 WL 8310958.
184. Id.
185. Factoids, RESEARCH ALERT, June 7, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 8842298.
186. Richard Estrada, Work Details Forget the Hype, Your Job Isn't Secure, Americans
Are Concerned About Current and Future Job Prospects, and for Good Reason, CHI. TRI.,
May 1, 1996, at A15.
187. Id.
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the country.1ls The new law may possibly free up the dockets of immigra-
tion courts, making more room for cases meriting a decision by an immigra-
tion judge.
Though the IRIRA vests authority in the INS officer to summarily
remove an undocumented alien found in the United States, the new law is
not without its own checks and balances. The URIRA supplies an in-depth
screening process of cases involving immigrants who may be truly fleeing
persecution by seeking asylum in this country including a review of credible
fear determinations by an immigration judge. The URIRA makes special
provisions for increasing the training of INS officers who will be handling
asylum cases. It also increases the administrative scrutiny of cases involving
illegal immigrants claiming asylum as a defense to their removal as opposed
to the typical removal procedure.
Whether or not an inadmissible alien enjoys constitutional protection
under the Fifth Amendment is a question, according to Justice Marshall,
189
yet to be decided by the Supreme Court. However, since 1889, the Supreme
Court has recognized, albeit in dictum, that excludable aliens are limited to
whatever due process that Congress may set forth in legislation. 190 The
IIRIRA is such legislation. Justice Marshall's dissent in Jean raises some
valid points and illustrates the legal arguments opponents of the new
legislation could raise. But as Justice Marshall rooted his analysis of the law
in logic, perhaps the more proper position that should be adopted is reflected
in a rather famous quote from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience."' 9' Justice Holmes
explained that, "[t]he law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
192
The removal of undocumented aliens found in this country who have
not been admitted to the United States is a method of managing nomadic
citizens of other countries. The Court's historical view that matters of
international relations are under the complete control of Congress would
indicate that Congress' exercise of that power, to wit, the IRIRA's provi-
sions denying judicial review of inadmissible aliens should be left untouched
188. Final Anti-Terrorism Bill Contains Major Immigration Changes, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 517, 523 (1996).
189. Jean, 472 U.S. at 858 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 865.
191. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
192. Id.
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by the judiciary. Furthermore, the individuals who are affected by the new
legislation are not citizens of the United States, therefore the resolution they
seek (i.e., admission to the United States) is not grounded in any claim of
right, but is a privilege granted by Congress. Accordingly, the denial of the
privilege to be admitted to the United States, which rests solely under the
control of Congress, does not fasten to it any guarantees of procedural due
process that the courts could review. Perhaps for the opponents of the
IRIRA, the new law is an overreaching attempt at correcting the immigra-
tion problems of this country. Nevertheless, endless discussion regarding
what should be done to correct a problem does little to resolve the matter at
hand. The IIRIRA is a comprehensive piece of legislation that includes
reasonable internal checks on the law's administration. Yet most important
of all, the URIRA is an affirmative attempt at remedying a problem in this
country that burdens every citizen of the United States-illegal immigration.
Paul S. Jones
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